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DOES IT MATTER HOW ONE OPPOSES MEMORY 
BANS? A COMMENTARY ON LIBERTE  
POUR L’HISTOIRE 
ROBERT A. KAHN

 
This Article examines Liberté pour l’Histoire, a group of French 
historians who led the charge against that nation’s memory laws and, in 
the process, raised unique arguments not found elsewhere in the debate 
over hate speech regulation. Some of these arguments—such as a focus on 
how the constitutional structure of the Fifth Republic encouraged memory 
laws—advance our understanding of the connection between hate speech 
bans and political institutions. Other arguments, however, are more 
problematic. In particular, Liberté historians struggle to distinguish the 
Holocaust (which is illegal to deny) from the Armenian Genocide (which 
is not). The Liberté historians are also hostile toward multiculturalism. 
While this reflects the French culture in which the historians operate, it is 
normatively unappealing. This is especially true given the existence of 
other, more inclusive European arguments against hate speech regulation, 
such as those of Danish cartoon publisher Flemming Rose and Maltese 
Judge Giovanni Bonello.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005 several leading French historians established Liberté pour 
l’Histoire (“Liberté”) to oppose a spate of laws punishing the denial of 
historical events such as the Armenian Genocide and the Atlantic slave 
trade.
1
 The larger debate over memory laws—especially outside of 
France—has focused on the slippery slope argument: If France bans 
Armenian Genocide denial, what’s next?
2
 This approach to memory laws 
meshes nicely with the dominant libertarian tradition in the United States, 
which, following Justice Brandeis, sees the best response to speech as 
more speech.
3
 
The Liberté arguments against French memory laws depart from this 
libertarian consensus in four ways.
4
 First, the historians distrust the 
 
 
 1. In 1990 France passed the Gayssot Law, which bans Holocaust denial. While there were 
concerns at the time about the creation of official histories, the memory law issue did not crest until a 
decade later. See generally David Fraser, Law’s Holocaust Denial: State, Memory, Legality in 
GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW, 3, 3–48 (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas Hochmann eds., 2011). See 
infra Part II for a description of the specific laws. 
 2. See, e.g., Timothy Garton Ash, This Is the Moment for Europe to Dismantle Taboos, Not 
Erect Them, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/oct/ 
19/comment.france.  
 3. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 4. My analysis draws on the website of Liberté pour L’Histoire, http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?lang=en. In particular, I rely on the three “fundamental texts” as described on the 
website. René Rémond, History and the Law, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (2006), http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=184&lang=en); Pierre Nora, 
Historical Identity in Trouble, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (2006), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=152&Itemid=182&lang=en); Francoise Chandernagor, 
The Historian at the Mercy of the Law, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (2008), http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=150&Itemid=179&lang=en. I also rely on 
Pierre Nora’s report to the twenty-first meeting of the International Congress of Historical Sciences 
held in Amsterdam on June 23, 2010. See Pierre Nora, History, Memory and the Law in France (1990-
2010), LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (posted on the Liberté website Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=159%3Apierre-nora-qlhistoire-la-memoire-
et-la-loi-en-france-1990-2008q&catid=53%3Aactualites&Itemid=170& lang=en. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/6
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marketplace of ideas the libertarian position relies on. Instead, they seek to 
insulate the historian from a political marketplace of partisan lobbying and 
ethnic politics.
5
 Second, the Liberté approach to memory bans is uneven: 
While they grudgingly tolerate the French ban on Holocaust denial, the 
Liberté historians are much more comfortable rejecting bans on other 
genocides or crimes against humanity—at times in language casting doubt 
on the underlying historical events.
6
 Third, Liberté historians also oppose 
a broad range of multicultural commemorations and, in effect, support 
censorship of a significant segment of French society in the name of 
freedom of speech.
7
 Finally, Liberté writers often relate their opposition to 
memory laws to a specific idea of France. For them, memory laws are not 
simply a threat to freedom of speech but also a threat to the historians’ role 
in guarding France’s national identity.
8
  
My Article seeks not only to understand the Liberté arguments but also 
to critically challenge them. In particular, I ask if there are more inclusive 
ways of opposing French memory laws. Consider, for example, the 
European Court of Human Rights Justice Giovanni Bonello, who has 
advocated for an American-style protection of offensive speech across 
Europe.
9
 Bonello takes this position without opposing multiculturalism; to 
the contrary, he combines his libertarian position with a consistent concern 
for the rights of ethnic and racial minorities across Europe.
10
 Why can’t 
the Liberté historians take the same approach—especially with the 
Armenian Genocide?
11
 This raises a second set of questions: What is the 
source of this resistance to multiculturalism? Does it rest on personal, 
 
 
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
 7. See infra Part IV.D. 
 8. See infra Part IV.E. 
 9. In this regard, consider European Court of Human Rights Judge Giovanni Bonello, who has 
advocated for an American-style protection of offensive speech. See Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 73 (1999) (calling for adoption of the American incitement to “imminent lawlessness” standard 
in Europe based on Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).  
 10. See Tonio Borg, The Dissenting Opinions of Judge Giovanni Bonello, in WHEN JUDGES 
DISSENT: SEPARATE OPINIONS OF JUDGE GIOVANNI BONELLO AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 441, 442–43, 447–48 (Mario Schiavone ed., 2008) (describing Bonello’s rulings in cases 
involving human rights and the Roma).  
 11. Let me make a caveat here. I am not referring to all Liberté historians, or to everyone who 
has posted on the Liberté website. Indeed, a recent article by Paulo Lobba on the Liberté website takes 
a nuanced approach to the question of genocide denial. See Pablo Lobba, The Fate of the Prohibition 
Against Genocide Denial, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194%3Ale-destin-de-la-penalisation-du-negationnisme-
par-paolo-lobba&catid=53%3Aactualites&Itemid=170&lang=en (suggesting that genocide denial 
could be punished where there is a “tangible” harm, such as incitement of hatred or violence). Instead, 
I focus on the early “fundamental” texts of the group. 
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political, social and cultural factors? Or are such attitudes inevitable given 
the nature of the laws Liberté historians are opposing?   
In the next section, I sketch the rise of memory laws in France and 
Liberté’s campaign against them.
12
 To provide a baseline for what 
follows, I offer a brief summary of classic libertarian arguments one could 
use against memory laws.
13
 The bulk of the essay describes, with a critical 
eye, the Liberté arguments against memory laws with a special emphasis 
on the Armenian Genocide and multiculturalism.
14
 The conclusion returns 
to the question of how to oppose hate speech bans.
15
 Here I contrast the 
Liberté historians’ closed, nationalistic approach with the more inclusive 
defenses of speech exemplified by Justice Bonello and, to take another 
example, Danish journalist Flemming Rose.
16
 
II. FRENCH MEMORY LAWS AND THE RISE OF LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE 
A. Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial 
The French memory laws occupy a unique place in the universe of hate 
speech regulation. Most bans on hate speech focus on harm.
17
 The 
connection can be direct, as when a code criminalizes the instigation of 
violence against a specific group, or indirect, as when the statute bans 
speech that spreads hatred (which can lead to harm).
18
 Even though 
libertarians criticize these laws as unduly restrictive of speech, the laws 
 
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. Id. Flemming Rose is perhaps best known for his role in the Danish Cartoon controversy, but 
he also fashioned a novel theory of freedom of speech in his 2010 memoir, The Tyranny of Silence. 
Rooted in brave speakers who challenge taboos, this theory may prove more effective in spreading 
opposition to memory laws—especially to groups traditionally excluded from the dominant national 
identity. See FLEMMING ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE (2014). See also Robert A. Kahn, Flemming 
Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon and the Poverty of Comparative Constitutional 
Theory, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 657, 679 (2014) (for a description on how Muslims should be able to 
joke about Jews, Danes about Swedes and Norwegians, and whites and blacks about each other). 
 17. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (for a general defense of hate 
speech laws). 
 18. See also Steven J. Roth, The Laws of Six Countries: An Analytical Comparison in UNDER 
THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES 177 
(Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993) (for a description of different approaches that Canada, 
France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States take on hate speech regulations). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/6
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themselves can be hard to use.
19
 This relates to the nature of hate speech. 
While some statements (“Let’s kill the ___”) appear on their face to 
constitute incitement to hatred or violence, other statements (“Auschwitz 
is a myth”) are harder to place.
20
 This is especially true when hate 
speakers use coded language to spread their message while avoiding 
liability. 
One response to these difficulties is to make some speech acts per se 
criminal. For example, Germany has criminalized the swastika; likewise 
Virginia, Georgia and other southern states in the United States ban cross 
burning.
21
 These laws take the burden off the prosecution by supplying an 
inference that the speech act in question is intrinsically hateful. Thus the 
swastika is always a sign of totalitarianism and genocide, and the burning 
cross always represents Ku Klux Klan-instigated violence.
22
 Likewise, one 
can view Holocaust denial as inherently signifying approval for National 
Socialist racial ideology.
23
  
In another way, however, Holocaust denial is different. Denial of the 
Nazi mass murder of Jews not only spreads hate; it is also a statement 
about a historical event. The challenge of reconciling these two meanings 
can be shown by comparing German and French Holocaust denial bans. 
Germany enacted its ban months after court rulings suggesting that bare 
Holocaust denial (i.e. a statement denying the gas chambers, number of 
Jews killed, or absence of genocidal intent not accompanied by additional 
statements targeting Jews or Zionists as the source of the Holocaust “lie”) 
was not incitement to racial hatred.
24
 The denial ban passed in 1994 is part 
of § 130 of the Penal Code, which covers hate speech. In 1995 the new 
law was enforced against a neo-Nazi group that used the phrase 
 
 
 19. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAHN, HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
17–22 (2004) (for a discussion on how German courts struggled to determine whether bare Holocaust 
denial harmed human dignity in a way sufficient to justify prosecution under hate speech laws). 
 20. See Robert A. Kahn, Offensive Symbols Where to Draw the Line: An American Perspective, 
in MEDIA FREEDOM AND REGULATION IN THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (A. Koltay ed., 2014) (for more on 
the relationship between genocide denial and hate speech). 
 21. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002). See also Robert A. Kahn, The Legal Regulation 
of Cross Burning and Holocaust Denial in Comparative Perspective, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163 
(2006). 
 22. The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black modified this inference by holding that states may 
only penalize cross burning when evidence suggests it was done with “intent to intimidate.” 538 U.S. 
at 363. Justice Clarence Thomas, in a lengthy dissent, would keep the inference; for him, cross burning 
is always done with an intent to intimidate. Id. at 398 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 23. See Robert A. Kahn, Holocaust Denial and Hate Speech, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE 
LAW 77, 77–108 (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas Hochmann eds., 2011).  
 24. See KAHN, supra note 19, at 20–21 for an overview. 
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“Auschwitz Myth” as an organizing tool.
25
 Viewed in its entirety, 
Germany’s Holocaust denial ban fits comfortably into a militant 
democracy-style restriction of hate speech aimed at protecting the state 
against a Nazi revival.
26
  
On its surface, the 1990 French Gayssot Law looks similar. Starting in 
1979, French deportees and civil rights groups sued Robert Faurisson, a 
Lyons III literature professor who discovered the “good news” that 
Auschwitz contained no gas chambers.
27
 While Faurisson was convicted 
under multiple legal theories, the trial was controversial because of court 
rulings that distinguished Faurisson’s research of “scientific nature” from 
the offensive way he publicized it.
28
 But the Gayssot Law was not a direct 
response to these rulings—the last of which was in 1983. Instead, it was 
part of a larger initiative aimed at stopping the growing power of Jean 
Marie Le Pen’s National Front.
29
 Finally, while the German law is limited 
to denying the Holocaust, the Gayssot Law bans questioning crimes 
against humanity (including the Holocaust) established by the London 
Charter of 1945—a potentially broader category.
30
  
 
 
 25. Id. at 77–83. 
 26. The phrase “militant democracy,” which dates from the fall of the Weimar Republic in 
Germany, refers to the concept that the state has a special obligation to defend itself against those who 
would destroy it. See Svetlana Tyulkina, Militant Democracy 13 (2011) (unpublished S.J.D. 
dissertation, Central European University), available at http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/tyulkina_ 
svetlana.pdf. While the concept has never caught on in the United States, it plays a much larger role in 
Europe where both the European Convention on Human Rights and national constitutions of some 
member states have provisions excluding rights of those who would undermine them. See also Robert 
A. Kahn, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech: A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post, 
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 557–63 (2013). 
 27. See also KAHN, supra note 19, at 31–37. 
 28. Id. at 36. The civil plaintiffs relied on a variety of legal theories including incitement to 
hatred and falsification of history (under a general tort provision establishing liability for those who 
harm others by failing in their professional duties). Id. at 32. Controversy arose when Faurisson used 
the process against him to put the Holocaust on trial and deepened when a variety of French courts 
seemed unable to condemn Faurisson’s point of view as history. Id. at 33–35. For instance, the trial 
court in the tort lawsuit found Faurisson guilty but refused to take a position on whether Faurisson 
falsified history. Id. at 35. The appellate court affirmed but, once again, refused to characterize 
Faurisson’s claims themselves, focusing instead on how he presented them. Id. at 36. 
 29. See KAHN, supra note 19, at 102–08 (describing the politics surrounding the passage of the 
Gayssot Law).  
 30. Because the London Charter formed the basis for the Nuremberg trials, the Gayssot Law 
applies to Holocaust denial. The definition in the Charter could, however, include other instances of 
crimes against humanity, including the Armenian Genocide. Human Rights Committee, Views of the 
Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 2.3, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (12/16/1996), at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/4c47b59ea48f7343802566f2
00352fea. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/6
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The difference was seen at the time. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, a French 
historian of ancient history, whose “Paper Eichmann” essay was one of the 
first public responses to Faurisson, supported the hate crime prosecutions 
but not the new law.
31
 Even at the time, the Gayssot Law was seen as 
leading the establishment of an official truth.
32
 
The fear of state-created truths would blossom a decade later. During 
the 1990s, however, the Gayssot Law was still viewed primarily as a hate 
speech law. In 1990 Robert Faurisson boldly challenged the law in a 
statement that called the Holocaust a “fairy tale.”33 Yet he was convicted 
after a trial that went much more smoothly than the earlier prosecutions.
34
 
Other French deniers were prosecuted as well.
35
 In 1996 the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee upheld the Gayssot Law.
36
 A 
concurring opinion by Justices Evatt and Kretzmer justified this result 
because of the role Holocaust denial plays in the spread of anti-Semitism 
in France.
37
 At this time, it was still possible to see the Gayssot Law like 
its German counterpart—as a narrow ban on Holocaust denial. Over time, 
the debate over these laws became quite familiar. Supporters stressed the 
importance of protecting the memory of the Holocaust in countries that 
had witnessed Nazi crimes.
38
 Opponents like Ronald Dworkin argued that 
liberty deserves protection, even if it comes at a “high cost.”
39
  
B. The Rise of the French Memory Laws 
Over time, this pattern began to change. In 1994, four years after the 
passage of the Gayssot Law, a group of Armenian citizens sued American 
 
 
 31. PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, ASSASSINS OF MEMORY (1992). Vidal-Naquet was active in Liberté 
before his death in 2006. 
 32. See KAHN, supra note 19, at 105–08. Opponents compared the new law to Stalinism, in part 
because the law’s supporter, Jean Claude Gayssot, belonged to the hard left French Communist Party. 
Id. 
 33. Id. at 108. 
 34. Id. at 108–11 (describing the trial). In particular, there were fears that the Faurisson would 
use the trial to repeat the offense—denying the Holocaust—in front of a large audience. This is what 
happened; but unlike in the early 1980s, the court did not offer any evaluation of Faurisson’s view 
about history. Instead, it affirmed the legislature’s power to ban denial. Id. at 109–10 (describing trial 
and court ruling). 
 35. KAHN, supra note 19, at 111–15. 
 36. Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 
(Nov. 8, 1996). 
 37. Id. para. 6 (concurring opinion of Justices Evatt and Kretzmer). 
 38. See Sévane Garibian, Taking Denial Seriously: Genocide Denial and Freedom of Speech in 
the French Law, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479 (2008). 
 39. Ronald Dworkin, The Unbearable Cost of Liberty, 3 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 43, 46 (1995). 
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historian Bernard Lewis over a statement he made in Le Monde denying 
the Armenian Genocide under § 1382 of the French civil code—the same 
section Jewish groups and civil rights organizations had used to sue 
Faurisson in 1979.
40
 In addition, the Armenian groups tried, 
unsuccessfully, to use the Gayssot Law to sue Lewis.
41
 These efforts 
represented a move away from viewing the Gayssot Law as an anti-Nazi 
measure—whatever else Lewis may be, he is not a Nazi. Rather the case 
reflects an emphasis on the intrinsic harm of genocide denial, which now 
deserves punishment not because of specific fears of extremist activity but 
because it is morally wrong.  
This shift opened the door to more, broader memory laws. In 2001 the 
French passed a law “recognizing” the Armenian Genocide.
42
 While not 
explicitly mentioning (or punishing) denial, the law is significant because 
of why the Gayssot Law prosecution against Bernard Lewis failed. The 
Gayssot Law makes it illegal to question events deemed “crimes against 
humanity” by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The Armenian Genocide was not 
covered by the Tribunal; therefore, the prosecution against Lewis was 
dismissed.
43
 One then can view the 2001 recognition law as an attempt to 
establish something equivalent to the Nuremberg Tribunal that might then, 
in theory, let prosecutions proceed.
44
 
A second 2001 law was much closer to the Gayssot Law in spirit. The 
Taubira Law, introduced by a French delegate from Guyana, passed 
unanimously.
45
 It extends the definition of crimes against humanity to 
include the Atlantic slave trade.
46
 In particular, it requires that “the 
curriculum and the research programs in history and the humanities . . . 
give the slave trade and slavery the consequent place they deserve.”
47
 
Building on this momentum, the 2005 Mekachera Law expressed “the 
gratitude of the nation” toward “its repatriated French citizens” and “the 
positive role of the French presence overseas.”
48
 The law was enacted by a 
 
 
 40. Yves Ternon, Freedom and Responsibility of the Historian: The Lewis Affair, in 
REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL: THE CASE OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 237, 244 (Richard G. 
Hovannisian ed., 1998). 
 41. Id. at 245. 
 42. Fraser, supra note 1, at 42. 
 43. Ternon, supra note 40, at 245. 
 44. Other motivations include encouraging Armenian Genocide awareness, especially in Turkey. 
See Fraser, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
 45. The Taubira law is described by Rémond, supra note 4. See also Nora, History, Memory and 
the Law in France (1990–2010), supra note 4. 
 46. See Rémond, supra note 4.  
 47. Id. 
 48. The law is described in Chandernagor, supra note 4.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/6
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conservative majority, concerned about the far right Front National 
(FN).
49
 In the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, the FN candidate, received more votes than the sitting center-left 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and only four percentage points less than 
Jacques Chirac, the center-right sitting prime minister.
50
 
In June 2005 a group of descendants of slaves from Reunion, Guyana, 
and the Caribbean (Collectifdom) raised the stakes by suing French 
historian Oliver Pétré-Grennouilleau under the Taubira Law.
51
 At issue 
was a book on the global slave trade Pétré-Grennouilleau had published 
the previous year.
52
 The book won an award and, as a result, Pétré-
Grennouilleau gave an interview in the Journal du Dimanche in which he 
viewed the slave trade in the “broadest sense” (i.e. as including non-
Western forms of slavery) and refused to call the Atlantic slave trade a 
genocide.
53
  
More memory laws were under consideration. By 2006 the French 
National Assembly was considering proposals to ban denial of the 
Ukrainian genocide of 1932–33, the genocide in the Vendeé (1792–93), 
and the World War II-era genocide against the Sinti and the Roma.
54
 
Competing proposals took up the French war in Algeria: One would make 
it illegal to deny crimes of humanity committed against Algerians during 
the war; the other would make it illegal to deny crimes against humanity 
committed by Algerians during that same period.
55
 There was talk of 
banning denial of crimes against humanity committed during the 
Crusades.
56
  
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Le Pen Upset Causes Major Shock, CNN, Apr. 22, 2002, http://edition.cnn. 
com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/21/france.election/?related. None of the candidates did especially well: 
Chirac had 20% of the vote, Le Pen finished with 17%, while Jospin took third place with 16%. While 
Chirac won his run-off with Le Pen convincingly with 82% of votes, his victory was weakened by the 
nature of his second round opposition. See Jacques Chirac Wins by Default, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 
2002, http://www.economist.com/node/1127414 (describing center-left supporters who chose to vote 
for a “thief” over a “fascist” and suggesting that Chirac, following his reelection, needs to show “la 
France profonde” that Parisian elites would not ignore them). 
 51. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Chandernagor, supra note 4 (for a list of the proposals). 
 56. Id. 
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C. The Historians Strike Back 
The Mekachera Law, the lawsuit against Pétré-Grennouilleau, and the 
growing number of memory law proposals triggered a reaction by French 
historians. After a forum entitled “No to Teaching an Official History,” the 
historians circulated a petition against the provisions in the Mekachera 
Law requiring historians to recognize the positive contributions of French 
colonialism.
57
 This led to the establishment of the Vigilance Committee 
Against the State Use of History.
58
 
A separate group of nineteen French historians signed a broader 
petition against memory laws as a whole. The petition read as follows: 
History is not a religion. Historians accept no dogma, respect no 
prohibition, ignore every taboo. 
Historical truth is different from morals. The historian’s task is not 
to extol or to blame, but to explain. 
History is not the slave of current issues. 
History is not memory. 
History is not a juridical issue. In a free state, neither the Parliament 
nor the judicial courts have the right to define historical truth. State 
policy, even with the best care . . . is not history policy.
 59
 
The signatories featured leading lights in French society including Pierre 
Nora, René Rémond, Pierre Vidal Naquet, and Elizabeth Badinter.
60
 But 
the historians did not simply sign a petition, they also formed an 
association—Liberté pour l’Histoire—with Rémond as its first 
president.
61
 When Rémond passed away in 2007, Pierre Nora took over as 
president—a position he still occupies as of 2015. 
The group operates on several levels. Part of its work involves raising 
consciousness. The group maintains a website that outlines the memory 
laws and the major arguments against them.
62
 The website posts 
information about developments in other countries (for instance, it has a 
 
 
 57. Nora, History, Memory and the Law in France (1990–2010), supra note 4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Appeal 2005, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE, http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=13&lang=en. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Nora, History, Memory and the Law in France (1990-2010), supra note 4. 
 62. See LIBERTE POUR L’HISTOIRE, http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?lang=en.  
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section about Russian memory laws).
63
 But Liberté also lobbies the French 
government. These efforts have been quite successful. In 2005 the French 
Constitutional Council struck down the part of the Mekachera Law 
requiring that public schools highlight the positive contributions of the 
French colonial experience.
64
  
In 2007 the European Union issued a Framework Decision requiring 
member states to take measures necessary to assure that “condoning, 
denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide” are punishable.”
65
 The 
idea of requiring European states to take some action against genocide 
denial had been in the air since 2001. The member states have responded 
in a variety of ways: Some states, often in Eastern Europe, passed 
genocide denial laws; others, like Germany, already had such laws.
66
 A 
third group of states—Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom—argued that currently existing laws were sufficient to “punish” 
genocide denial.
67
  
In France, the Framework Decision posed a challenge. The Gayssot 
Law only covers those “crimes against humanity” defined as such by the 
Nuremburg Tribunal. Was this enough to satisfy the new EU ruling? To 
sort this out, France appointed a special commission on memory laws 
headed by Bernard Accoyer.
68
 With advice from Liberté, the commission 
stated that France would only punish denial of those “crimes against 
humanity” (and genocides) defined as such by the international tribunal. 
This position—which echoed the Gayssot Law—placed France in accord 
with the Framework Decision.
69
 It also sent a message to French 
politicians: Only crimes against humanity defined as such by a legal 
tribunal could be subject to memory laws.
70
 This position ruled out bans 
on denial of the crimes committed in the Crusades, the slave trade, and the 
 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 65. See also Luigi Cajani, Adoption of the European Framework Decision, 17 May 2011, 
LIBERTE POUR L‘HISTOIRE (May 25, 2011), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=162%3Aadoption-de-la-decison-cadre-europeenne-au-17-mai-2011&catid=53%3A 
actualites&Itemid=170&lang=en. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Nora, History, Memory and the Law in France (1990–2010), supra note 4. See also Robert 
Badinter, Is This the End for the Historical Memory Laws, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=182%3A-intervention-de-
robert-badinter-a-lassemblee-generale-de-liberte-pour-lhistoire-2-juin-2012&catid=53%3Aactualites& 
Itemid=170&lang=en. 
 69. Badinter, supra note 68. 
 70. Id.  
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Armenian Genocide. This last point was particularly timely given the 
October 2006 passage by the National Assembly of Gayssot-like 
provisions covering the denial of the Armenian Genocide.
71
 
These were heady days for Liberté. The tide of memory laws had 
crested and began to subside. Part of the Mekachera Law was struck 
down. The Armenian Genocide proposal passed the National Assembly 
but—in 2006—went no further. The Accoyer Commission proposed a 
standard that would limit the scope of future memory laws. (One might 
ban denial of Rwandan genocide, or crimes against humanity in the former 
Yugoslavia, as well as future acts but the pre-1945 past was secure). When 
Collectifdom decided to withdraw its lawsuit against Pétré-Grennouilleau, 
arguing that legal action was no longer productive, Pierre Nora saw 
another example of the influence of the historians.
72
 
Speaking before a congress of historians in Amsterdam in 2010, 
Liberté president Nora allowed himself a note of triumph. Why was the 
battle over memory laws so extensive in France?
73
 To this, Nora conceded 
that the French political system had encouraged the passage of memory 
laws.
74
 But that same system ironically helped Liberté oppose those 
laws.
75
 Here Nora singled out the central Paris location of the Liberté’s 
offices, the ease of incorporating, and the access Liberté historians had to 
“political figureheads.”
76
 Times were good. 
To be sure, there were bumps in the road. The Accoyer Commission 
was supposed to prevent the adoption of further memory laws, but it could 
not stop the passage of the 2011 Boyer Law, which extended the 
provisions of the Gayssot Law to the denial of the Armenian Genocide.
77
 
This threat was removed in 2012 when the French Constitutional Council 
struck down the proposed ban.
78
  
 
 
 71. Mark Tran, French MPs Pass Armenian Genocide Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2006, 7:28 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/12/france.turkey. 
 72. According to Nora, Collectifdom dropped the case because of the “widespread” and 
“energetic” response of French historians. 
 73. Nora, supra note 4. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. French Senate Passes Bill Criminalizing Armenian Genocide Denial, Armenian Weekly, Jan. 
23, 2012, at 1.  
 78. Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2012-647, decided Feb. 28, 2012. For a critical 
overview, see Thomas Hochmann, La question mémorielle de constitutionnalité (à propos de la 
décision du 28 février 2012 du Conseil constitutionnel) 4 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT MICHEL VILLEY 
133 (2012) (Fr.).  
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The following year, the European Court of Human Rights decided 
Perinçek v. Switzerland, which struck down the application of 
Switzerland’s genocide denial law to a Turkish national who repeatedly at 
academic conferences described the Armenian Genocide as “an 
international lie.”
79
 The Swiss courts had convicted him under a national 
law making it illegal to deny genocide with racist intent.
80
 In overturning 
the conviction as a violation of the freedom of expression guaranteed 
under Article 10 of the European Convention,
81
 the Court held that there 
was no a “consensus” that what happened to the Armenians was a 
genocide, something distinguishing it from the Holocaust.
82
 While the 
ruling has been widely criticized,
83
 and a rehearing took place in 2015,
84
 
the decision suggests Liberté has made some headway in convincing 
European courts about the dangers of memory laws.  
The tide had turned. What arguments did Liberté use to achieve its 
successes? 
III. STANDARD LIBERTARIAN ARGUMENTS AGAINST GENOCIDE DENIAL 
BANS 
Let’s begin by saying what they were not. From an American 
perspective, the Liberté arguments are strange in two ways. First, while an 
American might be inclined to lump the memory laws together, the 
sharpest critics of the slave trade or Armenian Genocide denial bans struck 
 
 
 79. Perinçek v. Switzerland, APP. NO. 27510/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). The case was decided in 
French. There was, however, an English-language press release. European Court of Human Rights 
Press Release ECHR 370 (2013), Criminal Conviction for Denial that the Atrocities Perpetrated 
Against the Armenian People in 1915 and Years After Constituted Genocide Was Unjustified (Dec. 
17, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-4613832-5581451. 
 80. Press Release, supra note 79. The applicant was charged under Section 261bis of the Swiss 
Criminal Code. 
 81. See Eur. Conv. On H.R., Article 10. 
 82. Press Release, supra note 79, at 2. 
 83. See Uladzislau Belavusau, Armenian Genocide v. Holocaust in Strasbourg: Trivialization in 
Comparison Verfassungsblog, Constitution Blog (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/ 
armenian-genocide-v-holocaust-in-strasbourg-trivialisation-in-comparison/#.VOuqBOktF9A (chiding 
the Court for “ignor[ing the] simple fact that all genocides are a matter of contested recognition”); 
Thomas Hochmann, One Century Later: Freedom of Speech and the Denial of the Armenian 
Genocide, CritCom: A forum for research and commentary in Europe (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/one-century-later-freedom-of-speech-and-the-denial-of-
the-armenian-genocide (arguing that the Court failed to consider the “hateful content” requirement of 
the Swiss law). 
 84. Press Release, Registrar of the Court, Grand Chamber Hearing in the Case of Perinçek v. 
Switzerland (Dec. 17, 2013).  
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a different tune when it came to Holocaust denial and the Gayssot Law.
85
 
Second, a standard defense of freedom of speech turns on the marketplace 
of ideas; by contrast Liberté emphasized the historian’s role in protecting 
the collective vision of the past from pressure by politicians and their 
(pushy) constituents.
86
 To highlight these differences, this section takes up 
standard (non-Liberté) arguments in favor of freedom of speech and 
against genocide denial bans. 
Traditional defenses of freedom of speech rest on the premise that 
more speech is better—even if the reasons for this differ. For example, the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor draws on the ideas of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and John Stuart Mill to view open debate as enhancing the search 
for truth.
87
 Later in the twentieth century, the defense of speech shifted 
from truth to democracy—as Robert Post argued that a democratic state 
can only be truly legitimate if everyone can express his or her views.
88
 
Personal autonomy is another perceived benefit of open debate—a 
position advanced by C. Edwin Baker
89
 and in Europe by Flemming Rose 
and Salman Rushdie.
90
  
In addition to seeing speech acts as intrinsically valuable, traditional 
free speech supporters also rely on a series of arguments about the harms 
of censorship. Limiting speech, for example, requires an excessive trust of 
the government.
91
 When the restrictions involve protecting minority 
groups (i.e. hate speech) the government winds up using the laws against 
those same groups.
92
 Then there is the problem of the slippery slope.
93
 
 
 
 85. See infra Part IV.C. 
 86. See infra Part IV.B, D, and E. 
 87. Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, at 
667. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (raising the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 88. See, e.g., Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. R. 267 (1991) (discussing campus hate speech laws from the perspective of democratic 
dialogue theory); Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 14 
CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2007) (applying democratic dialogue theory to the Danish cartoon controversy). 
For a critique, see Kahn, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech, supra note 26, at 571–81. 
 89. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
 90. I discuss the Rose/Rushdie defense of speech at length in Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection 
of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, at 690. As the title suggests, Rose and Rushdie’s 
defense of speech differs from the traditional canon—especially in the emphasis it places on the way 
censorship silences the potential speaker (as opposed to taking up what the audience can handle). But 
Rose and Rushdie agree that the speech act itself is valuable—something that, as we shall see, 
distinguishes them from the Liberté historians. 
 91. Id. at 668. 
 92. Id. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 484, 554–55 n.359 (1984) (describing how the 1965 Race Relations Act in the United 
Kingdom was used to punish trade unionists, members of minority groups and anti-Nazi activists).  
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Restriction of neo-Nazi or Klan speech will, over time, lead to the 
restriction of other, less offensive speech. Finally there is a sense, 
expressed by Lee Bollinger and Flemming Rose, that restrictions on 
speech in one way or another take away from what makes us human—for 
Rose it involves a denial of our innate need to tell stories,
94
 and for 
Bollinger it forecloses the possibility of the “tolerant society,” a society 
that accepts difference because it is exposed to it.
95
  
From this perspective, the French memory laws are easy to criticize. 
While one can question whether tolerating deniers will enhance the 
marketplace of ideas, to the extent one trusts open debate, the cost of 
including deniers in it should be small.
96
 Likewise, a society that wants 
everyone—including Holocaust deniers—to accept the decisions reached 
by society (especially on issues of commemoration of the Holocaust, 
reparations and anti-discrimination laws) should allow deniers to express 
their opinion. Finally, to the extent human beings have a need to tell 
stories, society should not prevent deniers from telling such stories about 
the Holocaust (or the Armenian Genocide, or the slave trade) even if these 
stories are untrue. 
Added to this are concerns about censorship. If a society bans 
Holocaust denial (or denial of the slave trade) on the theory that the 
society is still anti-Semitic or racist, what is to prevent that society from 
enforcing speech bans in a discriminatory manner? Given that the Race 
Relations Act was used against minority groups (and the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act used against unions) is it a stretch to see the Gayssot Law used 
against Holocaust survivors or Jews?
97
 Opponents of memory laws would 
 
 
 93. Lee Bollinger refers to this vision of speech as the “fortress model” under which any breach 
of the fortress of speech protection is seen to have dire consequences. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE 
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 76–103 (1986).  
 94. See Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, at 
676. 
 95. BOLLINGER, supra note 93, at 10 (“[F]ree speech involves a special act of carving out one 
area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and 
demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters).  
 96. For a dissenting view see Fredrick Schauer, Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the 
Post-Millian Calculus, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION 
AND RESPONSES 129, 140 (Michael Herz and Peter Molnar eds., 2012) (given that some people still 
believe “that President Obama was born in Kenya and that President Bush knew in advance about the 
9/11 attacks,” Mill’s normative argument from truth appears less compelling). 
 97. While this argument may seem far-fetched, here are some examples. As noted above, a 
German court convicted a neo-Nazi group for using the phrase “Auschwitz myth.” Kahn, supra note 
19, at 77–83. Would the same phrase also be punishable in a scholarly discussion about representations 
of the Shoah? Or, to take another example, does Robert Bellini’s film Life is Beautiful deny the 
Holocaust by suggesting that the concentration camps were a game? Let me be clear, I am not saying 
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also rely on the slippery slope argument—as Timothy Garton Ash already 
has in connection with the ban on the Armenian Genocide: If France can 
ban this, what can’t France ban?
98
 Finally, both Bollinger and Rose would 
have little trouble viewing memory laws as restrictions on what makes a 
person or society fully human. 
In response, a Liberté supporter might object that the traditional 
arguments ignore compelling harms posed by memory laws and that, as a 
result, some memory laws may slip through the cracks. There is an 
element of truth here. A traditional civil libertarian might concede that 
genocide denial laws are tolerable when horrific events have left the 
society torn at the seams—as, for example, with Germany immediately 
after World War II. Deborah Lipstadt generally opposes genocide denial 
bans but understands why countries like Germany, Austria and France 
choose to ban denial.
99
 Shifting from space to time, Peter Teachout argues 
that Germany’s restrictions on genocide denial may have been defensible 
in the 1940s and 50s, but are less so today.
100
  
In crafting their compromise positions, Lipstadt and Teachout still 
generally agree with Justice Brandeis that the best response to bad speech 
is more speech. The Liberté position is quite different. 
IV. THE LIBERTÉ CASE AGAINST MEMORY LAWS 
That the Liberté historians, in opposing memory laws, do not follow 
the standard libertarian model is not surprising—indeed, one can ask if 
there even is a single model of libertarian opposition to hate speech 
bans.
101
 What is different—at least from an American perspective—is the 
tone. There is a harshness, one that turns the Armenians and descendants 
 
 
that these arguments carry weight. In fact, I find them unconvincing. But they are the type of claims a 
traditional free speech advocate to might make. 
 98. Garton Ash, supra note 2. Here Liberté makes an argument that fits into the general civil 
libertarian pattern of speech protection. As we shall see, this is not all that the Liberté historians say 
about the Armenian Genocide. See infra Parts IV.B & C. 
 99. Robert A. Kahn, Holocaust Denial and Hate Speech, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW, 
93–94 (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas Hochmann eds., 2011). 
 100. Peter Teachout, Making Holocaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-
Negationist Laws, from the Perspective of US Constitutional Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 655, 689–92 
(2006). Even Robert Post is open to the idea that in some countries democracy is not strong enough to 
sustain a fully democratic public discourse, although he remains skeptical. Interview with Robert Post, 
in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 11, 25 
(Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012). 
 101. See Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, at 
687–94 (suggesting that Flemming Rose has constructed a theory of free expression that does not rely 
on the classic examples of the United States free speech canon). 
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of slaves who support memory laws into ethnic lobbyists who, by their 
censorious conduct, threaten to unravel (or contaminate) the pristine 
national past. On this view, the role of the historian is to protect history 
from intrusions from the political sphere.
102
 Before taking up what the 
Liberté historians say about ethnic lobbying,
103
 the Armenian 
Genocide,
104
 multicultural commemorations
105
 and French identity,
106
 let 
me start with a more neutral theme about how the structure of political 
institutions can threaten freedom of speech.
107
 
A. Memory Laws and Political Structures  
Why, alone among stable Western democracies, does France punish 
denial of memory (even if some states, like Germany and Austria, punish 
Holocaust denial)? While Liberté historians offer cultural reasons for this 
French exceptionalism, they also look to institutions.
108
 During the Fourth 
Republic (1946–1958) French politicians used non-binding resolutions to 
grandstand and, at times, force votes of no confidence—which is one 
reason why there were so many different governments during these 
years.
109
 As a result, the Fifth Republic made it illegal for parliament to 
pass non-binding resolutions.
110
 While this may have helped foster 
political stability, it had a perverse effect when it came to commemorating 
genocides and opposing genocide denial.
111
 While other states could give 
voice to the harms of genocide (or crimes against humanity) by passing 
non-binding resolutions, in France the parliament was limited to passing 
laws.
112
 To that end, Liberté lobbied successfully for the return of non-
binding resolutions—another illustration of its lobbying prowess.
113
 
One can object to this explanation. The 2001 recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide looks more like a “resolution” than a “law.” The ban 
on non-binding resolutions did not prevent the establishment of a number 
 
 
 102. This recalls a saying about librarians at the Staatsbibliotek in Berlin when I was a graduate 
student in the mid-1990s: “The role of the librarian is to keep the people out and the books in.” 
 103. See infra Part IV.B. 
 104. See infra Part IV.C. 
 105. See infra Part IV.D. 
 106. See infra Part IV.E. 
 107. See infra Part IV.A. 
 108. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Nora, History, Memory and the Law, supra note 4. 
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of commemorative holidays. For example, July 16th was dedicated to the 
fight against anti-Semitism, while May 10th was dedicated to the memory 
of the slave trade.
114
 In addition, if the inability to pass non-binding 
resolutions explains the enactment of memory laws, why were only four 
such laws passed?  
On another level, however, the connection between political 
institutions and speech restrictions has merit. Preventing politicians from 
“blowing off steam” by passing symbolic legislation may well encourage 
speech restrictions.
115
 Liberté also made other institutional arguments. 
Memory laws were passed as “private bills,” which allowed them to 
bypass the Council of State, which could have acted as a road block.
116
  
The concern with the structure of political institutions is novel for 
opponents of hate speech regulation who, when they discuss politics at all, 
tend to express skepticism about the ability of governments to protect 
speech.
117
 Perhaps one can structure a constitutional democracy to 
minimize the need for hate speech laws.
118
 At the same time, Liberté’s 
emphasis on political structures points the way to other, more questionable 
arguments about politics and memory laws. 
B. Defending History from (Ethnic) Lobbyists 
Liberté demonizes politics and lobbying even though they have been 
pretty good lobbyists themselves. Some Liberté objections strike a global 
chord. René Rémond’s comment that “totalitarian regimes” are known for 
their attempt to “twist history to their advantage”
119
 fits into the larger 
claim heard across North America and Europe that genocide denial laws 
 
 
 114. Id. July 16th commemorates the day in 1942 when the roundups of Jews began in Paris. May 
10th is the date the French adopted the proposal for a day of remembrance of the slave trade, slavery 
and its abolition. See France.fr: The Official Website of France http://www.france.fr/en/institutions-
and-values/remembrance-slave-trade.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).  
 115. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. For an overview of this argument, see Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREMIST SPEECH AND 
DEMOCRACY 122, 137 (James Weinstein & Ivan Hare eds., 2009). 
 118. One could, for example, argue that Holocaust denial bans are more likely to occur in 
countries with inquisitorial legal systems in part because of the difficulty in reconciling the norms of 
adversarial justice with the tactics of Holocaust deniers. See Robert A. Kahn, Imagining Legal 
Fairness: A Comparative Perspective, in NEW APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS: INSIGHTS 
FROM POLITICAL THEORY (Jennifer Holmes ed., 2003). 
 119. Rémond, supra note 4. Chandernagor makes similar comments. See Changernagor, supra 
note 4 (calling memory laws “the preserve of totalitarian regimes, whether Fascist or Communist”). 
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improperly establish an “official truth.”
120
 But Liberté historians go 
further. In addition to calling memory law supporters totalitarians, they 
also taint memory law supporters for their association with a rough and 
tumble world of politics. This is unique. 
For example, Francoise Chandernagor refers to “specific groups” who, 
“charged with emotion,” become the “clientele” of demagogic 
politicians.
121
 She complains about “organizations, factions” and “pressure 
groups” whose legislative products are worthy of “contempt” because they 
are “slapdash.”
122
 Here she mentions a supporter of the 2006 Armenian 
Genocide bill who spent days amending the bill, often switching the prison 
term from one to five years and back again.
123
 Likewise, she faults the 
Taubira Law, which calls on educators to give a “consequent” place to the 
slave trade, for not defining that term.
124
  
An American might use the sloppiness of the memory legislation to 
show why the state cannot be trusted to enact such laws. But 
Chandernagor seems to argue that memory laws should be opposed simply 
because they are “slapdash”; the speech they prohibit seems secondary. 
Reading her essay, one gets the sense that Chandernagor would accept 
Armenian Genocide denial ban if only the proponents had stuck with a 
five year prison term. 
Nor is Chandernagor the only Liberté historian unhappy with memory 
law supporters. For Rémond, memory laws are “an expression of a 
typically contemporary mindset.” He worries about “replacing a collective 
understanding of the past” with “the disgruntlement of special interest 
groups.”
125
 Unnamed “religious or ethnic communities” are, in the name 
of recognizing their “particular past experience,” taking “history as a 
whole hostage.”
126
 This applies especially to the “utterly incorrigible” 
politicians who reintroduced a ban the Armenian Genocide even after 
Liberté took a stand against this “exploitative view of history.”
127
 
Pierre Nora strikes a similar note. After acknowledging that 
recognizing suffering and protecting victims are legitimate concerns, he 
 
 
 120. The opposition to the Gayssot Law in the National Assembly was explicitly political. In part 
this was because the bill was proposed by a Communist Party delegate the year after the fall of the 
Berlin wall. For more, see KAHN, supra note 19, 107–08. 
 121. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Rémond, supra note 4. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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warns about “the pressure of groups with a shared past.” These groups, in 
the name of history for “minorities,” seek to “dominate” the view of the 
past.
128
 They do this by “infiltrat[ing] the political sphere” through 
“electoral blackmail” and “personal physical threats”—a circumstance that 
leads Nora to question whether he is still talking about historical 
memory.
129
  
To American ears this is strange. Threats of physical harm against 
representatives of the people have no place in a constitutional democracy; 
but doesn’t freedom of speech allow for a wide variety of electoral 
expression including blackmail? To take a fairly recent example from the 
United States: In 2013 Republicans in the House of Representatives forced 
a government shutdown (and threatened a default on the debt ceiling) to 
convince President Obama to make changes to the Affordable Care Act.
130
 
While polls show that most Americans opposed the Republicans’ tactics, 
no one questioned their right to take this course of action.
131
 To put a 
gloss on Nora’s comment—after hearing about electoral blackmail, 
infiltration and domination—I wonder if he is still talking about freedom 
of speech. 
C. Liberté and the Armenian Genocide 
Liberté writers are especially wary of supporters of an Armenian 
Genocide denial ban. Chandernagor, explaining why the 2006 Armenian 
Genocide ban passed with less than 100 votes, suggested that most 
deputies skipped town to avoid facing the “vociferous groups” backing the 
law.
132
 Nora’s mention of physical violence may refer to the debate over 
the Armenian Genocide—although he does not make this clear.
133
 
Chandernagor, Rémond, and Nora emphasize the lack of any connection 
 
 
 128. Nora, Historical Identity in Trouble, supra note 4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in Budget Impasse, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013). 
 131. Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis Over Shutdown 
and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013 (noting that “the shutdown sent Republican poll numbers 
plunging”). 
 132. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 133. Interestingly the main supporter of the 2011 Armenian Genocide bill, Valerie Boyer, was the 
subject of a death threat shortly after she introduced the bill. French MP Receives Death Threats, 
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/french-mp-receives-death-
threats.aspx?pageID=238&nID=10181&NewsCatID=351. 
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between France and the Armenian Genocide.
134
 Something about the 
debate over the Armenian Genocide denial ban gets under their skin—
what is it? 
Liberté’s opposition to the Armenian Genocide denial ban could come 
from a principled objection to all hate speech laws. For those, like 
Flemming Rose, who take this view, the memory law debate is easy.
135
 
However, none of the Liberté historians take such a broad position. For 
example, Chandernagor tolerates speech “as long as it is not offensive, 
hateful or racist.”
136
 In terms of the Framework Decision, Liberté takes the 
same the position as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who refuse 
to enact Holocaust denial bans because they already ban racist hate speech. 
So even if most Americans oppose hate speech laws, Liberté does not.  
This makes the Holocaust denial ban in the Gayssot Law a harder issue 
for Liberté. The organization did not form in 1990 when France enacted 
the Gayssot Law. Nor did it form in 1996 when a controversy arose when 
Abbé Pierre, a Catholic priest who worked with the poor, and who was a 
very popular figure in French society, gave his support to Roger Garaudy, 
a Gayssot Law defendant.
137
 Instead, it took a lawsuit against a fellow 
historian for Nora, Chandernagor and Rémond to act.
138
 The same applies 
to Liberté as an institution; from the very beginning the group struggled 
with Holocaust denial. For example, the December 12, 2005, Appeal 
describes Gayssot Law as one of the provisions that “violat[ed] the 
principles” of the petition.
139
 Yet the version of the Appeal currently on 
the Liberté website lacks this language.
140
 Early Liberté articles likewise 
take an ambiguous position. Chandernagor concedes the Gayssot Law it is 
not “the most poorly worded” of the memory laws, but views it as a 
“Pandora’s Box.”
141
 Rémond warns that the Gayssot law can lead to less 
legitimate laws.
142
 Pierre Nora, writing in 2011, spoke of how the law was 
 
 
 134. For example, Nora writes “France had nothing to do with the extermination of the Armenians 
in 1915.” Nora, Historical Identity in Trouble, supra note 4. 
 135. See Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, at 
676, 678. 
 136. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 137. For an overview, see KAHN, supra note 19, at 116–17. There were, however, a number of op-
eds against the Gayssot Law in leading French newspapers. Id. 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
 139. See Mickaël Ho Foui Sang, Legislation, Collective Memory and History: When the French 
Legislature Deals with the Past, 3 SORTUZ: OŇATI JOURNAL OF EMERGENT SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 95 
(2011) (describing the 2005 version of the Appeal). 
 140. See Appeal 2005, supra note 59. 
 141. Chandernagor, supra note 4. Note the similarity to the slippery slope argument here. 
 142. Rémond, supra note 4. 
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seen as “the thin edge of the wedge” and how those with foresight—such 
as Pierre Vidal-Naquet—had the wisdom to oppose the law.
143
  
By 2010, however, the tune had changed. While Liberté continued “to 
be wary of the Gayssot law” and “regret[s] it intellectually speaking” the 
organization “does not campaign for its suppression” according to 
President Nora, and “does not wish to challenge it” because such a 
challenge would be seen as “authorizing and even encouraging the denial 
of the Jewish genocide.”
144
 Robert Badinter, past president of the 
Constitutional Council and long-time legal opponent of Robert Faurisson, 
took a similar stance.
145
 
Liberté’s grudging support for the Gayssot Law is an odd stance for a 
group troubled by state-created history. One can as a civil libertarian 
worry about “encouraging the denial of the Jewish genocide” while 
rejecting a legal response. Robert Post has argued that bans on Holocaust 
denial should be “rare”
146
—he can say this (at least in the United States) 
without being suspected of anti-Semitism. Liberté historians could have 
taken a similar position. Instead, they restrict their support of genocide 
denial bans to the Gayssot Law. In the process, they struggle with the 
Armenian Genocide which, because of its similarities to the Holocaust (for 
example, both genocides have inspired an active group of deniers) and the 
large Armenian community in France, has become a flashpoint in the 
memory law debate. 
In distinguishing the Gayssot Law from other memory laws, Liberté 
relies on two arguments. First, Liberté distinguishes the Gayssot Law 
based on the speaker’s purpose. While deniers of the Armenian Genocide 
or the Atlantic slave trade have many motives, the main reason for 
promoting Holocaust denial is to spread anti-Semitism. As Badinter puts 
it, the Gayssot Law was enacted to combat racism and xenophobia or, 
more particularly, to avoid a Nazi return to power.
147
 Likewise, Nora 
justifies his agnostic stance on the subject by asserting that the “Gayssot 
Law was certainly not voted [i.e. directed] against historians.”
148
 Other 
memory laws, no matter how justified they may be, lack the same anti-
Nazi purpose. 
 
 
 143. Nora, History, Memory and the Law, supra note 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Badinter, supra note 68. 
 146. Post, supra note 117, at 127. 
 147. Badinter, supra note 68. 
 148. Nora, supra note 4. 
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Second, Liberté relies on a technical argument. The Gayssot Law only 
applies to “crimes against humanity”
149
 ruled as such by an international 
tribunal. This, says Badinter, reduces the issue to one of “res judicata.”
150
 
Requiring an adjudicated crime against humanity restricts the potential 
scope of memory laws while insulating historians from the power of 
conflicting legislative majorities to restrict historical inquiry.
151
  
But how well do Badinter’s two points about underlying hatred and res 
judicata co-exist with one another? Does the fact that a “crime against 
humanity” is adjudicated by an international court mean that the denial of 
the crime must be motivated by hatred? Consider the recent Trayvon 
Martin case in the United States in which George Zimmerman, a citizen on 
neighborhood patrol, chased down an African-American teenager and then 
shot him.
152
 Zimmerman claimed he fired in self-defense, and a jury 
acquitted him.
153
 Now assume someone denies that George Zimmerman 
pursued Trayvon, or claims, falsely, that Trayvon had a gun. These 
denials, aside from being painful to the Martin family, could be read as 
supporting a racist agenda. But does this finding of racism depend on 
whether Zimmerman was actually convicted?
154
 
This is where the Armenian Genocide comes in: Between 1915 and 
1923 over one million Armenians were killed as part of a plan of forced 
relocation and extermination.
155
 Although the term “genocide” was coined 
after World War II (a formulation that might, interestingly enough, prevent 
 
 
 149. Badinter, supra note 68. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Jean-Noel Jeanneney, Lecture at the University of Melbourne: the Civic Responsibilities 
of Historians (Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=115%3Aj-n-jeanneney-qles-responsabilites-civiques-des-historiensq&catid=4%3Atribunes&Itemid= 
4&lang=en.  
 152. Lizette Alvarez and Carol & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-
verdict-trayvon-martin.html?_r=1. 
 153. Id. 
 154. In fact it might seem to. If a jury had convicted Zimmerman, it would behave been harder to 
deny that Zimmerman chased after Trayvon (or that Trayvon had a gun). But does this make someone 
who, despite the verdict, denies that Zimmerman chased Trayvon a racist? The same issue comes up in 
Holocaust denial. Does the mass of evidence presented at Nuremberg trials (and elsewhere) mean that 
anyone who denies the Holocaust is anti-Semitic? Or is there a space for the harmless “kook” who, 
without racist motivations, denies what everyone else accepts as true? 
 155. For more on the Armenian Genocide, see Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen & Robert Jay 
Lifton, Professional Ethics and the Denial of the Genocide, in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL 271, 272–
74, supra note 40, at 272–74. See generally Vahakn Dadrian, The Armenian Genocide: Review of its 
Historical, Political, and Legal Aspects, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 135 (2011). 
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the Holocaust from being called a genocide),
156
 Hitler was quoted as 
saying in 1939: “Who remembers the Armenians?”
157
 War crime trials 
followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire but these were suspended 
with Kemal Ataturk’s establishment of modern-day Turkey.
158
 To this 
day, the Turkish government not only refuses to label the events of 1915-
18 as genocide; the government also denies the occurrence of many of that 
period’s key events and the underlying facts, including numbers of 
Armenians murdered and the reasons they were killed.
159
 Furthermore, 
many Armenians fled to France in the aftermath of the genocide.
160
 
These facts explain why French Armenians tried to sue Armenian 
Genocide deniers under the Gayssot Law and, when this failed, pushed for 
a specific ban on denying the Armenian Genocide.
161
 For its part Liberté 
accepts hate speech bans and, more grudgingly, the Gayssot Law. 
Following the Accoyer Commission, Liberté distinguishes the Gayssot 
Law as only involving crimes adjudicated by an international court—a line 
that excludes most memory laws. If Liberté accepts a ban on Armenian 
Genocide denial, they lose a bright-line rule that could distinguish 
Holocaust denial bans, which they accept, from memory laws about 
Algeria, slavery and the Crusades, which they oppose.  
At the same time, excluding the Armenian Genocide has led Liberté 
historians to make strange claims about Armenians, the Armenian 
Genocide and genocide denial laws in general. For example, Rémond 
treats the Armenian Genocide denial ban as an attempt to trivialize the 
 
 
 156. See The Man Who Coined Genocide Spent His Life Trying to Stop it, NPR, Oct. 14, 2014, 
http://www.npr.org/2014/10/18/356423580/the-man-who-coined-genocide-spent-his-life-trying-to-
stop-it. The article summarizes an interview with Edet Belzberg, director of the documentary Watchers 
of the Sky which describes the life of Rafael Lemkin, the person who coined the term in 1943. 
According to Belzberg, Lemkin followed the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 
closely and was moved by his meeting with Soghomon Tehlirian, a survivor of the genocide.  
 157. Smith et al., supra note 155, at 282–83 (describing Hitler’s remark and efforts to deny it). 
 158. Richard G. Hovannisian, Denial of the Armenian Genocide in Comparison with Holocaust 
Denial in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL, supra note 40, at 219–21. 
 159. See Smith et al., supra note 155, at 272–73. This is much like Holocaust deniers who argue: 
No gas chambers. No planned extermination. No six million victims. See Hovannisian, supra note 40, 
at 203–04 (comparing Holocaust denial with Armenian Genocide denial). Additionally, during the 
1980s the Institute of Turkish Studies, funded by Turkey, attempted to promote denial in the United 
States. Id. at 274–85. Turkey’s interest in the genocide denial issue continues to this day. See Turkey 
Linking Major Arms Purchase to Armenian Genocide Recognition, ASSYRIA INT’L NEWS AGENCY, 
Feb. 22, 2015, http://www.aina.org/news/20150221203851.htm (describing how Turkey is waiting to 
purchase a multi-billion dollar air defense system to see how potential sellers mark the hundredth 
anniversary of the start of the Armenian Genocide). 
 160. For an overview, see MAUD S. MANDEL, IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENOCIDE: ARMENIANS 
AND JEWS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRANCE (2003). 
 161. See Ternon, supra note 40, at 244–45. 
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Holocaust,
 162
 a point that suggests the Holocaust and Armenian Genocide 
are somehow in competition with each other. His competitive frame of 
mind is odd given that Chandernagor faults the Gayssot Law for 
encouraging “intense competition on the area of historical memory.”
163
 
While Rémond admits “the Turks killed hundreds of thousands of men and 
women in appalling circumstances,” he takes issue with the label 
“genocide.”
164
 
Chandernagor and Badinter make a narrower argument. They claim 
that it is anachronistic to use the “genocide” label with the Armenians 
because in 1915 the term did not exist.
165
 The use of the “anachronism” 
argument lets them avoid what Rémond takes up directly: What does it 
mean to refuse to call the murder of hundreds of thousands an act of 
genocide? Here Rémond comes perilously close to the official Turkish 
position that the Armenian Genocide did not happen. 
To be fair, Rémond’s concern about the Armenian Genocide may have 
another source. During the historians’ debate of the 1980s, German 
historians and academics used the Armenian Genocide—described as 
such—to place the Holocaust in context, thereby making the Nazi crimes 
against Jews appear less important.
166
 One can, as a historian, object to 
this comparison or argue that all genocides are unique. This, however, 
differs fundamentally from asking whether the Armenian Genocide took 
place.
167
  
Another Liberté argument rests on geographic nexus—unlike the 
Holocaust, which saw 80,000 French Jews deported to their deaths, the 
Armenian Genocide took place in Ottoman Empire, not France.
168
 This is 
historically accurate. But the floodgate arguments that follow—if the 
Armenian Genocide is covered, why not the massacres of Native 
Americans in North and South America
169
—miss an important point about 
the nature of geographical connections, one that only has become more 
prominent in the Internet age. 
 
 
 162. Rémond, supra note 4. 
 163. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 164. Rémond, History and the Law, supra note 4.  
 165. Badinter, supra note 68; Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 166. For an overview of the debate, see CHARLES S. MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST: 
HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (rev. ed. 1998). 
 167. Oddly, however, Rémond neglects the simpler step of using the difficulty of defining 
genocide to argue against all genocide denial bans. 
 168. For a discussion of the Holocaust in France, see SUSAN ZUCCOTTI, THE HOLOCAUST, THE 
FRENCH AND THE JEWS (1999). 
 169. Ash, supra note 2. 
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Consider Israel, a country that bans Holocaust denial.
170
 Israel did not 
take part in the Holocaust. To use Rémond’s wording Israel was “not 
involved in the slightest”
171
 in that horrific event, and yet it bans denial. 
Rémond never, to the best of my knowledge, took a position on Israel’s 
denial law. Perhaps he would oppose it. But it is more likely he would 
reply by saying that, as the Jewish state, Israel has a special connection to 
the Holocaust; he might also add that a large number of survivors moved 
to Israel.
172
  
If true, however, this argument may prove too much. There is a large 
Armenian population in France, roughly the same size as the 450,000 Jews 
living in France.
173
 Rémond might reply that France lacks the historical 
connection with Armenia that Israel has with the Jewish people. But one 
result of the Armenian Genocide was the removal of the Armenians from 
their historical homeland; all that remained was a small rump state which 
was absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1922.
174
 Until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union seventy years later, the Armenian diaspora played a major 
role in representing Armenian interests worldwide. At the center of these 
efforts was the French-Armenian community, which was reinforced by a 
wave of genocide survivors who settled in France in the 1920s.
175
 Is denial 
of the Armenian Genocide less worthy of denial because, until 1991, there 
was no Armenian state to oppose the deniers? To the extent the argument 
takes this course, it rewards the perpetrators of genocide for a job well 
done. 
 
 
 170. Denial of Holocaust (Prohibition) Law, 5746-1986, SH No. 1187 P. 196 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/history/holocaust/pages/denial%20of%20holocaust%20-prohibition 
-%20law-%205746-1986-.aspx. 
 171. Rémond, supra note 4. 
 172. See TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST (2000) 
(describing the role of Holocaust survivors in shaping Israeli society). 
 173. For example, a report from ArmenianDispora.com places the Armenian Population in France 
at 450,000. See Armenian Population in the World, http://www.haias.net/news/_armenian-
population.html) (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). Another report on World Jewish Population for 2012 
issued by the Berman Institute of the University of Connecticut, places the number of “core” Jews in 
France at 480,000. See Berman Institute—North American Jewish Data Bank—University of 
Connecticut, World Jewish Population, available at http://www.jewishdatabank.org/studies/download 
File.cfm?FileID=2941. 
 174. See Levon Marashlian, Finishing the Genocide: Cleansing Turkey of Armenian Survivors, 
1920–23, in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL 113, supra note 40, at 113. 
 175. Tigran Yergivian, The Armenian Identity in France in the Grip of Memorialization, REPAIR 
ARMENO-TURKISH PLATFORM: STANDPOINT OF THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA, June 10, 2014, 
http://www.repairfuture.net/index.php/en/identity-standpoint-of-armenian-diaspora/the-armenian-identity-
in-france-in-the-grip-of-memorialization. 
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Other Liberté members showed more tact in making their arguments. 
For example, Robert Badinter, while opposing the Armenian Genocide 
denial ban, expressed more sympathy toward the Armenians. Unlike 
Chandernagor, who mocked the argument that denial of a genocide is way 
of participating in it,
176
 Badinter understands how “profoundly sensitive” 
Armenians are about 1915.
177
 He knows it from his own experience with 
Faurisson: “[W]hen you are confronted directly as a secondary victim, at 
one remove, of genocide denial, and you hear someone say that this never 
happened, when your father, your grandmother, your uncle and many of 
your cousins disappeared and you have never been able to find them—this 
is intolerable.”
178
 This explains, according to Badinter, why the 
Armenians are “so combative.”
179
 
And yet Badinter still calls on Liberté to remain vigilant against 
renewed efforts by Armenians to pass a genocide denial ban.
180
 The 
similarities between the Holocaust and Armenian Genocide are clear. In 
both cases revisionism is “odious.”
181
 The two cases depart, however, 
when it comes to the consequences of denial. Here Badinter finds nothing 
comparable in the Armenian context to the connection between Holocaust 
revisionism and anti-Semitism. In my view, this is a cleaner way to 
approach the issue, even if the 2007 murder in Turkey of Armenian 
journalist Hrant Dink by a seventeen-year-old Turkish nationalist shows a 
possible connection between denial and incitement to hatred in the 
Armenian case as well.
182
 
Here Badinter makes an argument American libertarians might 
recognize, even as they rejected it as insufficiently protective of speech: 
Genocide denial should only be punished when it is the equivalent of hate 
speech.
183
 Likewise, the geographic argument—the Armenian Genocide 
took place in Turkey, not France—could fit into the classic libertarian 
concern about slippery slopes. However, when the debate shifts to the 
slave trade and colonialism, the Liberté arguments move into uncharted 
waters.  
 
 
 176. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 177. Badinter, supra note 68. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Fury in Turkey at Editor’s Murder, BBC, Jan. 19, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6281193.stm. 
 183. As noted above, this is an increasingly popular position in Europe. See Lobba, supra note 11; 
Hochmann, supra note 78. 
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D. All Speech Is Good (Except for Supporters of Multiculturalism)  
The vaguely written Taubira and Mekachera Laws should be easy 
targets for a civil liberties group: What does it mean to give slavery its 
“consequent” place in the history books? How does one present 
colonialism in a positive light? And the laws’ scopes are wide—in 
addition to restricting historical inquiry they cover school teaching.
184
 One 
could, for example, appeal to academic freedom along the lines Robert 
Post has advanced in the United States.
185
 Yet the Liberté historians chose 
to take on multiculturalism in a way that limits the appeal of their 
arguments and calls into question their commitment to freedom of 
expression. 
Consider Pierre Nora. He begins his 2006 essay against the Taubira 
Law on a positive note, describing the “recognition of the history of 
minorities and their gradual emancipation,” a movement that led to an 
explosion of research topics for historians including “oral history, labor 
history, rural history and women’s history[.]”
186
 He speaks of a 
“revolution” running from the 1970s to the 1990s, one he compared to the 
“liberal romantic” revolution of the nearly nineteenth century.
187
 But alas 
the promise of “a happy future” was not destined to last.
188
 Instead of 
modestly asking that their vision be “recognized, respected and integrated 
into the overall picture of collective and national history” the new groups 
“imposed a partial and distorted viewpoint on the general interpretation of 
the past. . . .”
189
 
Nora explains how the French government canceled the celebration 
planned for the 200th anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz because of 
objections about Napoleon’s colonial policy.
190
 He sees a “runaway 
inflation” of victim-based commemoration that criminalizes the past. 
Followed to its extreme, a focus on memory suppresses “every kind of 
historical intelligence and reasoning.”
191
 Memory ignores “temporal 
differences,” incorrectly assuming that “values and standards” guiding 
 
 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2013). 
 186. Nora, Historical Identity in Trouble, supra note 4. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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moral interpretation “did not themselves have a history but had existed for 
all eternity.”
192
 
On one level, Nora’s comment about the failure to grasp “temporal 
differences” is valid. A society should be judged against its own standards, 
and as he points out, these standards are not fixed.
193
 But the point can be 
pushed too far. For example, Nora warns that the “ominous broadening of 
crimes against humanity” can lead to “absurd results” when applied to 
“human beings entirely unlike us.” History should honor the victims and 
the conquered but a “[H]istory entirely rewritten from [their] perspective 
. . . is a denial of history.”
194
 
The problem is that many people are “entirely unlike us.” Consider the 
Nazis—do they fall into this category? If so, does this mean we cannot 
pass judgment on them because their “values and standards” were 
different? From another perspective, does Nora need to make this 
argument at all? Isn’t it enough to say that a ban on Atlantic slave trade 
denial hampers intellectual freedom? Why go further and oppose not only 
the laws, but also the commemorations of the victims and conquered?  
To be fair, there are other arguments. For instance, Chandernagor asks 
how the Taubira Law would be applied. Who, for example, counts as a 
descendent of a slave (and as such could sue under the law)?
195
 
Chandernagor, who has white skin but is a descendant of a freed slave, 
wonders if she could sue.
196
 She also argues that the Taubira and 
Mekachera laws violate Article 34 of the French Constitution which holds 
that only the executive can regulate education.
197
 This is just the type of 
institutional separation of powers argument that enriches our comparative 
understanding of how societies deal with speech regulations. 
But in general Liberté historians follow Nora. For example, Rémond 
makes the claim (odd for a free speech advocate) that it would be better to 
repeal both laws (Taubira and Mekachera) or keep both.
198
 Repealing one 
without the other, by contrast, would distort history.
199
 In particular, 
repealing only the requirement to cast colonialism in a positive light 
without lifting the ban on denying the harms of the Atlantic slave trade 
 
 
 192. Id 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Chandernagor, supra note 4; see Rémond supra note 4 (making the same general point). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Rémond, supra note 4. 
 199. Id. 
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would create the improper impression that colonialism was only a negative 
experience.
200 
This is all the more so, given the role—according to 
Rémond—of colonialism in abolishing the slave trade.
201
 
Strangely, Liberté rarely takes up the other beneficiaries of the 
Mekachera Law—the repatriated French population. One could, for 
example, ask who this category includes: The right wing voting pied noir 
who the bill’s sponsors were trying to pull away from Jean Marie Le Pen? 
Or the harkis, the native Algerians who, at the end of the Algerian War for 
Independence retreated to France with the pied noir and now face 
discrimination?
202
 Perhaps one reason for this omission is that the 
“repatriation” provision does not fit into the larger Liberté narrative of 
minority backed speech restrictions symptomatic of what Chandernagor 
calls the “French virus” of “accusation and self-flagellation.”
203
  
Nora also minimizes the role of memory laws in protecting pied noir 
memory (and colonialism). Uncomfortable about critiques of colonialism 
that prevent national celebrations, he asks why France, of all European 
powers “implicated in the colonial enterprise” internalized the new anti-
colonial accusations.
204
 Nora has some interesting thoughts on this subject 
which we will explore in the next section;
205
 but Nora can only reach this 
conclusion by picking and choosing among the memory laws.
206
 The 
Mekachera Law in particular is hard to cast as an expression of 
multicultural guilt. 
E. Guarding the National Past 
Perhaps the largest departure from the standard discourse concerns the 
historian’s role. Much of what Liberté says here is quite thoughtful. For 
instance, Jeanneney distinguishes between those who used their skills as 
historians to conduct “contemporary analyses of great contemporary civic 
importance” from the broader question of the professional duty of 
 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Rémond’s willingness to make the broad claim that colonialism ended the slave trade stands 
in contrast to his reluctance to treat the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians as a deliberate 
act of genocide. Id. 
 202. For more, see Nancy Honicker, “Douche France” . . . Growing Rough Around the Edges, 29 
THE KENYON REVIEW 81 (2007). 
 203. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 204. Nora, Historical Identity in Trouble, supra note 4. 
 205. See infra Part IV.E. 
 206. The same point goes for proposed laws as well. One could, for example, view the proposed 
laws about the Crusades and French crimes against humanity in this way. But does it describe the 
proposed laws about the Ukrainian genocide? Or those about the Vendeé?  
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historians of preserving the past.
207
 Jeanneney traces this duty to the 
Dreyfus Affair, during which historians were called on to sort out a 
conflict between two competing visions of the nation—one based on the 
national interest, the other based on individual rights.
208
 According to 
Jeanneney, this awakened “the determination to intervene in public life as 
historians.”
209
 
From a comparative constitutional perspective, Jeanneney shows how a 
historical controversy—the debate over the innocence or guilt of Captain 
Alfred Dreyfus—shaped current discourse over memory laws. One could 
make similar arguments about past events in other discursive 
communities.
210
 Moreover, his focus on the “nation” highlights some 
peculiar aspects of Liberté’s case against memory laws. Defenses of hate 
speech often focus on the speech act—can society tolerate it? (If we ban 
cross burning, what comes next?) Less frequently, they focus on the 
speaker: Do speech restrictions harm individuals by preventing them from 
telling stories about their experiences?
211
  
The Liberté position differs in two respects. First, it focuses on the 
audience’s right to hear, a less frequent defense of free speech.
212
 Second, 
the way the Liberté defines the “audience” is quite different; rather than an 
atomized set of individuals, Jeanneney focuses on a collective entity: the 
“nation.”
213
 
The connection between history and the nation is deep. Indeed, “history 
will always remain the nation becoming aware of itself.”
214
 Jeanneney 
recounts how Ernest Lavisse, author of the History of France, a common 
textbook at the start of the Third Republic, described the historian’s job as 
 
 
 207. Jeanneney, supra note 151. 
 208. Id. For more on the Dreyfus Affair, see LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 
MATTERS (2009). 
 209. Jeanneney, supra note 151. 
 210. For example, one could view the post-Brandenburg restriction on hate speech laws in the 
United States as reflecting the American experience with McCarthyism during the 1950s or with the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s. For the latter interpretation, see SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: 
THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY (1994). 
 211. See Kahn, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16, 
675–78. 
 212. This type of argument appears in cases of informal censorship. For example, a college 
newspaper that refuses to run an add denying the Holocaust has limited the information available to its 
audience. See also Miss. Gay All. v. Gouldelok, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that under the 
First Amendment a newspaper cannot restrict advertisements about meeting time of gay student 
group).  
 213. Jeanneney, supra note 151. 
 214. Id. (quoting Alphonse Aulard, a historian of the French revolution, in 1903). 
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separating what favors the nation from what gets in the way.
215
 This, 
however, need not prevent historians from being objective. Rather, as 
Gabriel Monod, a nineteenth century historian quoted by Jeanneney put it: 
history “in a mysterious and sure way” works toward “the greatness of the 
nation” and “the progress of humanity.”
216
 Here we find a historical 
version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand. 
Rémond, Nora and Chandernagor share this view. For instance, 
Chandernagor speaks despairingly of the “collapse” of the “national 
narrative,” something she attributes to memory laws.
217
 Likewise, 
Rémond, in isolating the harm caused by memory laws, speaks of “the 
fragmentation of the collective historical memory.”
218
 For his part, Nora 
asked whether a “human community or nation can do without an organic 
relationship to the past and a positive relationship to their history.”
219
 Nora 
went a bit further, tracing the “current national malaise” in France “ill at 
ease with its history.”
220
 
These concerns require the historian to act. For Nora, the historian 
bears a civic responsibility to engage in a “struggle” for “the survival of 
intellectual freedom and civil liberties in a democratic state.”
221
 Rémond 
sees historians as acting “in the name of the right of every citizen to have 
access to unbiased knowledge of history.”
222
 This role belongs uniquely to 
historians—not because they have a monopoly of history, but because of 
their competence.
223
 As Rémond puts it, a politician can express his or her 
views but cannot propose memory laws without personally investigating 
an event the way a historian would.
224
 
What, however, if the result of “unbiased” history shows the nation in a 
less than glorious light? What if Monad’s “invisible hand” does not work? 
The Liberté historians have specific concerns about France as well as a 
commitment to the historical method.
225
 How do they resolve this tension? 
 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (quoting Gabriel Monad). 
 217. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
 218. Rémond, supra note 4. 
 219. Nora, Historical Identity in Trouble, supra note 4. 
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 222. Rémond, supra note 4. 
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 224. Id. Strangely, Rémond appears to suggest that memory bans would be acceptable if only 
politicians first studied the historical period in question See id.  
 225. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (highlighting the importance of French identity) 
and notes 210–12 (describing the professional duties of historians). 
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To put this in broader terms: One of the features of classic American free 
speech theory is its thinness. The arguments about truth, democracy and 
personal autonomy do not require a particular account of the good life, 
although some, like Bollinger, see positive results flowing from the 
toleration of speech.
226
 Instead, the approach—especially in the United 
States—is to tolerate speech first, and ask about consequences later.
227
 
How do the Liberté historians resolve this tension? 
One strategy is to view multiculturalism as the cause of France’s ills. 
On this view, one can protect the nation while, at the same time, defending 
freedom of speech. But instead of blaming multiculturalism (and the 
memory laws) entirely on minority groups, Nora views it as a problem 
deeply rooted in French culture.
228
 He identifies a “pathological 
relationship between France and its past,” which he traces to its “centuries-
old claim and commitment to universality.”
229
 This reflects itself in an 
“obsession with national unity” and the fabrication of a “spotless self-
image.”
230
 When France experienced a series of “shocks” (the Revolution, 
the Occupation and decolonization), the “lies, falsifications [and] 
obstructions” committed by the state to protect the national image made 
the past appear “bleaker than it really was.”
231
 Worried there may be 
“skeletons in the closet,” France has become a nation of “virtual penitents” 
building on “two thousand years of Christian remorse” to effect a 
“sweeping indictment and proscription of France.”
232
 This, in turn, reflects 
weakness: “[O]ur pain free age” consigns the past to a “chamber of 
horrors” precisely because it is violent.”
233
 
For Liberté, memory laws restrict freedom of speech and express 
national weakness. By opposing the laws, Liberté defends freedom of 
speech, while restoring France’s national collective past—a past tarnished 
by the move towards what Chandernagor refers to as “self-flagellation.”
234
 
In one respect, Nora’s image of France is the flip side of Lee Bollinger’s 
tolerant society, which is strengthened through exposure to offensive 
 
 
 226. See BOLLINGER, supra note 93, at 10. 
 227. See supra Part III. 
 228. Nora, supra note 4.  
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speech.
235
 By contrast, a French culture of “spotlessness” and image 
regulation has created weak citizens who now apologize for themselves.
236
  
Yet the use of multiculturalism as a foil itself raises questions. Is the 
Mekachera Law really an expression of multiculturalism? What about the 
proposals to ban denial of the Armenian Genocide? Moreover, was the 
opposition to Austerlitz celebration really about guilty “native” French 
citizens, upset that national image has been called into doubt? Isn’t it also 
a reflection of French citizens of Caribbean ancestry upset about the 
persistence of racism well into the Fifth Republic? Citation Needed If the 
latter is true, why isn’t Liberté encouraging them, while gently nudging 
them to choose research, education and inquiry over state censorship? 
Skipping a celebration of Austerlitz (or sitting through a demonstration 
during that celebration) is a small price to pay for winning a new group of 
supporters to freedom of expression.  
Liberté may be getting the message. In a 2012 press release opposing 
the Armenian Genocide denial ban, Liberté explained that the ban would 
“provok[e] Turkish nationalism to extreme reaction” by making the 
“official denial permanent” and hampering “the courageous struggle by 
thousands of Turkish citizens and intellectuals to bring about the necessary 
recognition of past crimes.”
237
 Instead of treating the Armenian Genocide 
as a second class, or historically questionable event, the press release 
makes an argument for free inquiry over censorship.
238
 
There is another problem with Liberté approach, one rooted in the 
claim that memory laws are anachronistic because “crimes against 
humanity” is a twentieth-century concept.
239
 As Mickaël Ho Foui Sang 
points out, what passes for objectivity in history, and the norm of judging 
the past on its own merits, has itself changes over time.
240
 By becoming 
guardians of the national past the historians—at least in their Liberté 
work—have masked “the political nature of the choice” between 
 
 
 235. See BOLLINGER, supra note 93, at 10. 
 236. Here Nora echoes Geert Wilders’ critique of Dutch elites who sacrifice national identity in 
the name of tolerance. 
 237. Press Release by Pierre Nora of Liberté pour L’Histoire, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=171%3Acommunique-de-presse-de-pierre-
nora-au-nom-de-liberte-pour-lhistoire&catid=5%3Acommuniques&Itemid=15&lang=en.  
 238. Id. (describing how by “provoking Turkish nationalism” the proposed genocide denial ban 
“hampers the courageous struggle by thousands of Turkish citizens and intellectuals to bring about the 
necessary recognition of past crimes.”) 
 239. Chandernagor, supra note 4. 
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competing views of the historical past.
241
 From an American perspective, 
this is a high price to pay for banishing memory laws, especially given the 
availability of other, more inclusive arguments against them. 
V. CONCLUSION: HOW (NOT) TO OPPOSE HATE SPEECH LAWS 
From a descriptive perspective, the Liberté arguments expand the 
debate over hate speech regulation in several ways. But are these 
arguments normatively desirable? Do they help or hurt the case against 
European hate speech laws? Let me offer some observations. 
Let’s begin with the positive. Liberté clearly adds to the debate over 
hate speech regulation with its emphasis on how political structures shape 
the possibility of hate speech laws. The institutions Liberté singles out—
the inability of politicians to make non-binding resolutions and the use of 
private member laws—suggest steps opponents of memory laws (and 
perhaps hate speech laws more generally) can take to achieve their 
objectives. The lessons learned from Liberté’s experience could apply to 
speech restrictions in other countries.
242
  
Other implications are mixed. Distinguishing the Gayssot Law from 
proposals to ban Armenian Genocide denial has proved difficult.
243
 While 
the difficulty of line drawing is a common insight, the essays by René 
Rémond show the ease with which arguments about genocide denial bans 
can turn into arguments about genocides (their magnitude, their relevance 
for the country considering the ban, etc.). Indeed, at times, the argument 
went beyond minimizing the Armenian Genocide to negative comments 
about Armenians—who become dangerous, violent lobbyists forcing their 
views on French society.
244
 
This leads to another problematic aspect of the Liberté discourse. 
Concerned about protecting “the national past,” the historians express 
great disdain for the “multicultural” supporters of the memory laws.
245
 
Departing from the traditional argument that the best response to bad 
speech is more speech, Liberté views calls for memory laws from 
Armenians and descendants of slaves as ritual pollution that prevents the 
 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Here, as always, the question of legal transplantation remains. Allowing politicians to enact 
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transmission of French identity to future generations. This argument is 
novel. While supporters of protecting hate speech, like Lee Bollinger, 
focus on society’s ability to tolerate offensive speech,
246
 the Liberté 
historians argue that hearing offensive speech can be a social good. 
Perhaps an American needs to see a KKK demonstration to remember the 
national history of slavery and segregation; in France, uninhibited 
discussion of the Atlantic slave trade or the French colonial experience 
could lead to a more healthy view of French national identity. But the 
Liberté historians are not consistent; a true commitment to speech would 
also encompass those members of France who call for multicultural events 
and protest France’s legacy of colonialism. 
Here the Liberté discourse is troubling. Let me give a comparative 
example. A few years ago Danish cartoon publisher Flemming Rose 
released his memoir, The Tyranny of Silence, which defends the decision 
to run the cartoons as part of a larger account of freedom of speech.
247
 At 
the time, there was only an English-language excerpt available.
248
 Given 
Rose’s role in publishing the cartoons, I was not expecting to like the 
excerpt. By contrast, I was very impressed by the lineup of historians on 
the Liberté website. René Rémond’s Religion and Society in Modern 
Europe is a masterpiece
249
; Pierre Nora’s work in Holocaust studies is 
very well respected.
250
 
After studying the Liberté essays and The Tyranny of Silence, I find 
myself drawn to Rose’s romantic theory of speech protection.
251
 The focus 
on the human subject’s need to tell stories is easy to understand, as is his 
concern about the impact of censorship on the speaker. To be sure, Rose’s 
theory has its problems—taken to its logical extreme, his theory would 
undercut all restrictions on speech. But for all the anti-immigrant 
harshness in Danish society in run up to the publication of the Danish 
cartoons, Rose’s theory of speech protection is inclusive
252
—at least 
 
 
 246. BOLLINGER, supra note 93, at 10. 
 247. Rose, Flemming Rose’s Rejection of the American Free Speech Canon, supra note 16. 
 248. The Cato Institute published the English language edition in 2014. When I wrote my article, 
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compared to Pierre Nora and René Rémond both of whom use the memory 
law debate to go after multiculturalism. (Is it really necessary to object to 
establishing May 10th as a day of recognition of the slave trade in an 
article about freedom of expression?”). 
Others may disagree and find the Liberté historians more convincing. 
But something leaves me uneasy. I undertook the project of examining the 
Euro-American debate over hate speech bemoaning the “thin” nature of 
the American objections to hate speech laws. Europe seemed so much 
more interesting. But like a traveler drawn to home cooking after a long 
trip abroad, as I read through the Liberté materials the merits grew on me 
of simple, general arguments against speech restrictions—ones that extol 
expression without insulting potential recipients of the message.
253
  
It does matter how one opposes hate speech laws. Europe has a history 
of racism and genocidal violence. While it is tempting to say things have 
changed since 1945, the current spate of hatred directed towards the 
Roma,
254
 the rise of the anti-Semitic Jobbik party in Hungary,
255
 and the 
support for ritual slaughter bans
256
 in a variety of European countries 
gives ample reason to be wary. Hate speech laws express this realty—even 
if they are not the most effective solution to the problems of hate speech 
and neo-Nazi revival. As Nora himself recognizes, in this atmosphere 
opposing hate speech laws can give the wrong impression, which is why 
he cannot bring himself to oppose the Gayssot Law.
257
 But rhetoric he and 
his colleagues use in opposing French memory laws is quite harsh. Read 
the wrong way, it suggests that people of Armenian or Caribbean ancestry 
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are not authentically French. Even read sympathetically, it creates a 
stereotypical ethnic censor, in the process failing to distinguish sincere 
anti-racism from a desire to censor public discourse. A more inclusive 
opposition to hate speech restrictions, one based on human commonalities 
rather than differences, is more likely to win supporters in an increasingly 
diverse Europe that remains less than a lifetime removed from the Nazi 
past.  
In closing, let me return to European Court of Human Rights Judge 
Giovanni Bonello. He took a strikingly American perspective on free 
speech, requiring the incitement to imminent lawlessness standard of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.
258
 Yet, when he retired in 2010, no one could doubt 
his commitment to minority groups across Europe.
259
 His skepticism of 
speech restrictions came packaged within a broader opposition to racism 
and protection of ethnic, racial and religious rights.
260
 At times, the 
Liberté historians seem to get this—Nora opens his 2006 essay by 
highlighting the advances of multiculturalism. But as a whole, Nora, 
Chandernagor, and Rémond’s opposition to memory laws spills over into 
opposition to the groups who propose them. Is this inevitable or simply 
unfortunate? 
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